skill, he has not in fact been able to avail himself of these opportunities. In my treatise I have attempted to show throughout that the analysis, which according to the Reporter's Notes underlies the tentative drafts of the Restatement Second, includes a vast number of cases that fail to decide conflicts between differing laws and can therefore not properly be adduced as authorities 7 I have further attempted to show that the language of most of the remaining cases is fatally burdened by the theories advanced by the Restatement which have now been recognized as erroneous, and is frequently, if not usually, inconsistent with the results actually reached. Finally, even casual perusal of the Reporter's Notes shows how rarely the new drafts have heeded the nearly unanimous opposition of today's leading authors, very few of whom are included among his Advisers. But be this as it may, an obviously conclusive reason for discontinuing the Restatement Second is the Reporter's concession that "choice of law, even now, is not ripe for restatement in the sense that it is rarely possible to state hard and fast rules with the reasonable assurance based on precedent and the resources of human reasoning and imagination that these rules will work well in all situations to which they literally can be applied." ' Although having made this concession, Professor Reese still sees justification for a continuation of his effort in the hope to formulate "rules" which at least will not mislead' and will not be in the way of progress."° But even this aim, all too modest for this ambitious enterprise, is not reached with regard to the outstanding example for such a "rule," namely the recurring reference to the law with "the most significant relationship." In its most recent application in the conflicts law of torts this reference is not only misleading, being admittedly contrary to existing law, but also in the way of progress and thus contrary to reason.
Professor Reese admits that "until recently the courts with rare unanimity applied the law of the place of injury to determine rights and liabilities in tort,"" but discounts that practice because "recently ... several important courts have either expressed dissatisfaction with the rule or else have reached results that are inconsistent with it."'" That fact might have justified a detailed analysis of results actually reached in individual fact situations.' 3 But it does not justify the American Law Institute under the pretext of "restating" existing law to advance a general proposition which, prior to its tentative announcement, had never been adopted by any court. A "restatement" cannot be properly used to "aid in inducing the courts to Reese, supra note 2, at 699. ' 5 There is only one problem among twenty "issues covered" ( § § 3791-39og) as to which the Draft is not satisfied with the law of the "most significant relationship," namely the problem of intra-family immunity ( § 390g (North Carolina) , speaking through Chief Judge Sobeloff. Plaintiff, a North Carolina business corporation, in order to qualify for a loan of $2,ooooo for the expansion of its business, found it necessary to seek insurance in that amount on the life of its president. Attempting to distribute such insurance among several companies, plaintiff applied to defendant, a Pennsylvania company, for a $2oooo policy. Approximately three weeks later defendant informed plaintiff's agent that only a $50,ooo policy could be approved and this counter offer was accepted with the request for further consideration of the matter. Its president having died two days later, plaintiff sought damages based on defendant's allegedly negligent delay in acting on the application. Although the court assumed, without so holding, that North Carolina law would permit such actions, it affirmed a summary judgment for defendant based on the law of Pennsylvania to the contrary.
In applying the law of that state the court discounted a line of North Carolina traffic accident cases in which foreign law had been applied as the law of the place of wrong, on the ground that in all of those cases the place of wrongful conduct had coincided with that of the injury, so that the North Carolina courts had never had occasion to consider "the multi-state features presented here." ' '1 Treating the case,
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Reese, supra note 2, at 699. Cf. Reese, supra note Ii, at 392, where the author expresses doubt as to the wisdom of the rule now advocated in his draft for the Restatement Second. The inadequacy of the procedure underlying the preparation of the Restatement Second is dramatically illustrated by the fact that the crucial "most significant relationship" formula was first introduced by a 13 to x2 vote of the Council of the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332b (note) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 196o therefore, as one of novel impression, the court would have been free to start its analysis with the basic law of the forum. As I have tried to show elsewhere, courts whose jurisdiction is properly invoked have at all times and in all countries, unless misled by wrong dogma, applied their own law except where legislative or settled judicial rules of choice of law or the policy of the forum's municipal rule have required a different answer.' 8 If the court had followed this approach, it would have analyzed the policy of the initially applicable rule of the forum. It might have determined that the North Carolina tort rule was primarily designed to admonish insurers to improve their practice in handling applications.' 9 It might then have permitted defendant to exculpate itself under the law of Pennsylvania as the law to which the conduct of its business was properly adjusted," 0 or precluded such exculpation on the ground that defendant was admitted to do business in North Carolina, a fact that apparently was the basis of the court's jurisdiction. ' In choosing between these answers the court might have wished to ascertain whether the defendant or the plaintiff had initiated their relationship. Or the court might have interpreted the North Carolina rule as primarily designed to distribute fairly the losses inevitably caused by modern interstate mass operations and given priority to the law of North Carolina as the law of that state by which the plaintiff could reasonably expect to be protected. 22 In any event, the court would have established a new rule of choice of law on grounds of forum policy that would have been a meaningful guidepost for the future. And there is little doubt that this distinguished court would have done just that-were it not for the fact that the American Law Institute had just announced its new facile formula. Plaintiff had claimed applicability of the law of North Carolina because it was in that state that its president had resided and died, that it was engaged in business, and that it suffered the loss. But, feeling called on "to inquire which state has the most significant relationship with the events constituting the alleged tort and with the parties," 2 the court held that Pennsylvania law was applicable since "the important events upon which liability, if any, would rest occurred in Pennsylvania." 2 4 The most significant relationship was thus found in that state in which "the alleged delay, the foundation of the cause of action, took place. 2 5 With this reasoning we are back to the first Restatement, to that very theory of "analytical jurisprudence," of territorialism, and vested rights, which the "most significant relationship" formula of the tentative draft for the Restatement Second purports but fails to displace 6 For again we are entangled in the circular reasoning which refers us to the law under which the "cause of action" is alleged to have vested, and again the place of wrong, so often fortuitous, assumes its predominant importance. But it must be noted that this reversion to obsolete dogma is by no means chargeable to the court. The authors of the draft would protest in vain that the "most significant relationship" test, if properly applied, would discard the theoretical basis of the first Restatement. To be sure, "in determining the relative importance of the contacts," the Restatement Second would among other things let the forum also consider "the relevant purposes of the tort rules involved." 2 7 But not only has it, among the significant contacts, retained the places of injury and conduct; 28 not only has it preserved the general theory of "legislative jurisdiction"; 2 " but it has generally maintained the concept of rules governing certain situations 80 in a "neutral forum." 31 Conflicts rules applicable in such a court are necessarily based on the erroneous assumption of a law that is applicable a priori wherever the suit is brought. If the neutral court was properly invoked, its primary reference would always have to be to its own law and the policies underlying itY 2 The actual result in the Lowe case was no doubt prompted by its peculiar facts, namely the lack of any indication of wrongful conduct by the defendant 3 and the ambiguity of the law of the forum, 34 in the same manner as a much-noted contract case using the "most significant relationship" formula was no doubt prompted by its equities. In that case the New York court of appeals, contrary to the law of New York, rejected a support suit by a New York mother by reference to the law of Illinois which permitted an alleged father to buy off his obligations to the child without judicial approvalY 5 One may presume that the court did so because the father had generously fulfilled his moral duties. 6 Clearly, then, the "most significant relationship" formula is readily usable as a tool to give effect to equitable considerations. But this formula, if recognized and applied as an abstract rule for the choice of a governing law, may lead those courts unaware of the intricacies and pitfalls of conflicts law to arbitrary decisions unguided by the indispensable analysis of the primary law and policy of the forum 3 7 Ceterum censeo.... 
